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Abstract
We investigate market forces that would lead to the emergence of new classes of players in the spon-
sored search market. We report a 3-fold diversification triggered by two inherent features of the spon-
sored search market, namely, capacity constraints and collusion-vulnerability of current mechanisms.
In the first scenario, we present a comparative study of two models motivated by capacity constraints
- one where the additional capacity is provided by for-profit agents (or, mediators), who compete for
slots in the original auction, draw traffic, and run their own sub-auctions, and the other, where the ad-
ditional capacity is provided by the auctioneer herself, by essentially acting as a mediator and running
a single combined auction. This study was initiated by us in [12], where the mediator-based model was
studied. In the present work, we study the auctioneer-based model and show that this single combined-
auction model seems inferior to the mediator-based model in terms of revenue or efficiency guarantee
due to added capacity. In the second scenario, we initiate a game theoretic study of current sponsored
search auctions, involving incentive driven mediators who exploit the fact that these mechanisms are
not collusion-resistant. In particular, we show that advertisers can improve their payoffs by using the
services of the mediator compared to directly participating in the auction, and that the mediator can also
obtain monetary benefit by managing the advertising burden of its advertisers, without violating incen-
tive constraints from the advertisers who do not use its services. We also point out that the auctioneer can
not do very much via mechanism design to avoid such for-profit mediation without losing badly in terms
of revenue, and therefore, the mediators are likely to prevail. Thus, our analysis indicates that there are
significant opportunities for diversification in the internet economy and we should expect it to continue
to develop richer structure, with room for different types of agents and mechanisms to coexist.
1 Introduction
Sponsored search advertising is a significant growth market and is witnessing rapid growth and evolution.
The analysis of the underlying models has so far primarily focused on the scenario, where advertisers/bidders
interact directly with a primary auctioneer or AdNetwork, e.g., they bid for ad-space at leading search engine
and publisher portals. However, the market is already witnessing the spontaneous emergence of several
categories of companies who are trying to mediate or facilitate the auction process. For example, a number
of different AdNetworks have started proliferating, and so have companies who specialize in reselling ad
inventories. Hence, there is a need for analyzing the impact of such incentive driven and for-profit agents,
especially as they become more sophisticated in playing the game.
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Formally, in the current models, there are K slots to be allocated among N (≥ K) bidders (i.e. the
advertisers). A bidder i has a true valuation vi (known only to the bidder i) for the specific keyword and she
bids bi. The expected click through rate (CTR) of an ad put by bidder i when allocated slot j has the form
CTRi,j = γjei i.e. separable in to a position effect and an advertiser effect. γj’s can be interpreted as the
probability that an ad will be noticed when put in slot j and it is assumed that γj > γj+1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ K
and γj = 0 for j > K . ei can be interpreted as the probability that an ad put by bidder i will be clicked on
if noticed and is referred to as the relevance of bidder i. The payoff/utility of bidder i when given slot j at a
price of p per-click is given by eiγj(vi − p) and they are assumed to be rational agents trying to maximize
their payoffs.
As of now, Google as well as Yahoo! use schemes closely modeled as RBR(rank by revenue) with
GSP(generalized second pricing). The bidders are ranked in the decreasing order of eibi and the slots are
allocated as per this ranks. For simplicity of notation, assume that the ith bidder is the one allocated slot
i according to this ranking rule, then i is charged an amount equal to ei+1bi+1
ei
per-click. This mechanism
has been extensively studied in recent years[5, 9, 13, 10, 4, 6]. The solution concept that is widely adopted
to study this auction game is a refinement of Nash equilibrium independently proposed by Varian[13] and
Edelman et al[5]. Under this refinement, the bidders have no incentive to change to another positions even
at the current price paid by the bidders currently at that position. Edelmen et al [5] calls it locally envy-free
equilibria and argue that such an equilibrium arises if agents are raising their bids to increase the payments
of those above them, a practice which is believed to be common in actual keyword auctions. Varian[13]
called it symmetric Nash equilibria(SNE) and provided some empirical evidence that the Google bid data
agrees well with the SNE bid profile. In particular, an SNE bid profile bi’s satisfy
(γi − γi+1)vi+1ei+1 + γi+1ei+2bi+2 ≤ γiei+1bi+1
≤ (γi − γi+1)viei + γi+1ei+2bi+2 (1)
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , N . Now, recall that in the RBR with GSP mechanism, the bidder i pays an amount
ei+1bi+1
ei
per-click, therefore the expected payment i makes per-impression is γiei ei+1bi+1ei = γiei+1bi+1.
Thus the best SNE bid profile for advertisers (worst for the auctioneer) is minimum bid profile possible
according to Equation 1 and is given by
γiei+1bi+1 =
K∑
j=i
(γj − γj+1)vj+1ej+1 (2)
and therefore, the revenue of the auctioneer at this minimum SNE is
K∑
i=1
γiei+1bi+1 =
K∑
i=1
K∑
j=i
(γj − γj+1)vj+1ej+1 =
K∑
i=1
(γj − γj+1)jvj+1ej+1. (3)
In the present work, we continue to pursue a perspective transversal to the previous studies such as in
the above mentioned articles, initiated in [12] by us. We investigate the emergence of scenarios, where
advertisers/bidders do not interact directly with the auctioneers, as well as, the elements that trigger such a
diversification in the sponsored search market. We report a 3-fold diversification in the terms of
• the emergence of new market mechanisms
• the emergence of new for-profit agents, and
• the participation of a wider pool of bidders/advertisers.
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Such a diversification is triggered by two inherent features of the sponsored search market:
• Capacity constraints: One natural constraint in the sponsored search advertising framework arises
from the fact that there is a limit on the number of available slots (or slots that receive any clicks
from users), especially for the popular keywords, and as a result, a significant pool of advertisers
are left out. In [12] we intitiated a study of the emergence of diversification in the sponsored search
market triggered by such capacity constraints in the sense that new market mechanisms, as well as,
new for-profit agents are likely to emerge to combat or to make profit from the opportunities created
by shortages in ad-space inventory. In [12], we proposed a model where the additional capacity is
provided by for-profit agents (or, mediators), who compete for slots in the original auction, draw traf-
fic, and run their own sub-auctions. It was shown that the revenue of the auctioneer, as well as the
social value (i.e. efficiency), always increase when mediators are involved. An important question
left open in that paper was - what if the auctioneer wants to provide the additional capacity herself by
essentially acting herself as a mediator and running a single combined auction? Does the revenue of
the auctioneer/efficiency improves or does it degrade in such a model? We investigate this direction
in Section 2 of the present work. Following [12], the quality of the additional capacity is measured by
a fitness factor. We show that, unlike the mediator-based model, often there is a tradeoff between the
revenue and the capacity, and there is a phase transition from possibly a gain in terms of revenue to a
loss as the fitness increases, meaning that there is a critical fitness value beyond which the auctioneer
always loses in revenue. However, there exist scenarios where the revenue of the auctioneer could
indeed increase by increasing capacity. In the case of efficiency, the result is more in consonance
with the mediator-based model, i.e., the efficiency increases as fitness increases. However, unlike
the mediator-based model, the efficiency could indeed decrease by increasing capacity. Neverthe-
less, there is a phase transition and a critical fitness beyond which efficiency is never lost by adding
capacity.
• Collusion-vulnerability of current mechanisms: In Section 3, we initiate a game theoretic study of
current sponsored search auctions, involving incentive driven mediators who exploit the fact that these
mechanims are not collusion-resistant. As we know, the market is already witnessing the spontaneous
emergence of several categories of companies who are trying to mediate or facilitate the auction
process and it is likely that such mediators would exploit such opportunities. In particular, we will
show that advertisers can improve their payoffs by using the services of the mediator compared to
directly participating in the auction and mediator can also obtain monetary benefit by managing the
advertising burden of its advertisers and in fact at the same time being compatible with incentive
constraints from the advertisers who do not use its service. We also point out that the auctioneer
can not do very much via mechanism design to avoid such for-profit mediation without losing badly
in terms of revenue, and therefore, the mediators are likely to prevail. Thus, our results show that
mediators can play a significant role in sponsored search auctions, and can potentially impact the
revenues earned by the auctioneer.
2 Diversification triggered by capacity constraints
In this section, we study the emergence of diversification in the sponsored search market triggered by ca-
pacity constraints in the sense that new market mechanisms, as well as, new for-profit agents are likely
to emerge to combat or to make profit from the opportunities created by shortages in ad-space inventory.
Such a study was initiated by us in [12]. In [12], we proposed a model where the additional capacity is
provided by for-profit agents (or, mediators), who compete for slots in the original auction, draw traffic, and
run their own sub-auctions. It was shown that the the revenue of the auctioneer, as well as the social value
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(i.e. efficiency), always increase when mediators are involved. As we pointed out there, internet economy
is already evolving to such a diversification 1. An important question left open in that paper was - what if
the auctioneer wants to provide the additional capacity herself by essentially acting herself as a mediator
and running a combined auction? Does the revenue of the auctioneer/efficiency improves or does it de-
grade in such a model? At a philosophical level we can interpret the comparative study of the two different
models for providing additional capacity- one via for-profit agents and other via auctioneer herself as the
study of evolution versus design in the case of sponsored search market. For a detailed description of the
model where the additional capacity is provided a for-profit agent(mediator), the readers are referred to [12]
wherein the following theorem is proved.
Theorem 1 Increasing the capacity via mediator improves the revenue of the auctioneer, as well as, the
efficiency.
2.1 The model where additional capacity is provided by the auctioneer
Now we formally describe the model where the additional capacity (i.e. additional slots) is provided by the
same auctioneer/search engine.
• Additional slots: The additional slots are obtained by forking one of the original slots. By forking
we mean the following: the auctioneer puts her own ad/link in that slot, and on the associated landing
page, she puts some information relevant to the specific keyword along with space for additional
slots. We have considered the single fork case for the sake of simplicity of presentation and so that
the calculations do not get unwieldy, but the results can be easily extended to the case where the
auctioneer forks multiple slots and adds additional capacity.
• Properties of the additional slots and fitness factor: The quality of the additional slots is measured
by a fitness factor. Let the probability associated with the ad put by the auctioneer for creating
additional capacity to be clicked, if noticed, be denoted as f˜ . Moreover, the position-based CTRs for
the additional slots in the landing page will in general be different than on the main page, and it might
actually improve, say by a factor of α. This means that the position based CTR for the jth additional
slot on the associated landing page is modeled as αγj . Therefore, we can define a fitness factor f
to indicate the effective quality of additional slots being created, which is equal to f˜α. Thus, if the
original slot being forked is l, and there are L additional slots being created on the landing page, then
the effective position based CTRs for the additional slots thus obtained are γlfγ1, γlfγ2, . . . , γlifγL
respectively. Clearly, fγ1 < 1; however, f itself could be greater than 1.
• A single combined auction: Auctioneer runs a single combined auction to sell original slots together
with the additional ones. Therefore, a bidder is allowed only to bid for all slots (original slots plus the
additonal ones) together and not for the two kind of slots individually. This is unlike the case with
the additional capacity being created by a for-profit agent (mediator) [12] where the mediator runs her
own sub-auction. Further, for the comparative analysis in the following, we assume that this combined
auction is run via RBR with GSP i.e. the mechanism currently being used by Google and Yahoo! and
the solution concept we use is Symmetric Nash Equilibria(SNE)/locally envy-free equilibria[5, 13].
• New position based CTRs: Note that in the combined auction there are now K˜ = K + L− 1 slots
and for each slot there will be a probability of being noticed if an advertiser is assigned to that slot i.e.
its position based CTR. We rename the slots in the decreasing order of their CTRs. That is, the jth
slot is the one having jth maximum of the elements from the set {γ1, γ2, . . . , γl−1, γl+1, . . . , γK} ∪
1For example, the keyword “personal loans” or “easy loans” and the mediator “personalloans.com”.
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{γlfγ1, γlfγ2, . . . , γlfγL} and its CTR is denoted by γ˜j . For the sake of simplicity, we assume that
there are no ties i.e. no two slots have the same position based CTRs. Therefore, like γj’s we have
γ˜j > γ˜j+1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ K + L − 1 and γ˜j = 0 for all j ≥ K + L. Further note that, γ˜j = γj
for j ≤ l − 1, and γ˜l < γl. Therefore γ˜j − γ˜j+1 = γj − γj+1 for j < l − 1, γ˜l−1 − γ˜l > γl−1 − γl,
and γ˜j − γ˜j+1 could be greater than or less than γj − γj+1 for l ≤ j ≤ K depending on how the new
position based CTRs are distributed among the old ones.
• Capacity: The capacity is defined as the sum of position based CTRs. Thus the capacity in the
original model without the additional slots is C0 =
∑K
j=1 γj and in the model with the additional
slots it is C =
∑K+L−1
j=1 γ˜j =
∑K
i=1,i 6=l γj + γlf
∑L
i=1 γi. Note that for a fixed L, l, the capacity
increase iff f increases, for a fixed l, f , it increase iff L increases.
• Notation: The bidder/advertiser i’s value and bid are denoted by vi and bi respectively and her rele-
vance (i.e. quality score) is denoted by ei. Further, for simplicity we will denote eivi by si and eibi
by ri.
2.2 Revenue of the auctioneer
Now we discuss the loss or gain in the auctioneer’s revenue due to the added capacity as per the model in
Section 2.1. First, recall that the auctioneer’s revenue always increases in the model where the additional
capacity is provided by a mediator (Theorem 1) and in fact the revenue of the auctioneer increases as the
fitness of the mediator increases, thus there is no conflict between the revenue and the capacity in that model.
However, as we shall see in the following, in the model of Section 2.1 often there is a tradeoff between the
revenue and the capacity. First, we define the value of capacity and then establish a sufficient condition for
the gain in the revenue of the auctioneer in the following theorem whose simple proof is deferred to the
Appendix.
Definition 2 Value of capacity: Let R0 be the original revenue of the auctioneer without added capacity
and R be the new revenue of the auctioneer after adding capacity at their corresponding minimum SNE
[5, 13], then the “value of capacity” is defined as R−R0
R0
i.e. the relative gain in the revenue of auctioneer
per impression.
Theorem 3 For a given L, if ∃l ≤ K such that
η > 1−
(
(γl − γ˜l)(l − 1)sl +
∑K+L−1
j=K+1 (γ˜j − γ˜j+1)jsj+1∑K
j=l(γj − γj+1)jsj+1
)
(4)
where η = min
K≥j≥l
γ˜j − γ˜j+1
γj − γj+1
(5)
then the value of capacity is positive, i.e., revenue of the auctioneer increases by adding capacity.
We first provide an example to confirm that the above theorem does not give a vacuous sufficient condition
and the value of capacity can indeed be positive.
Example 4 Let l = K and geometrically decreasing γj’s[1, 6] i.e. γj = rj−1, 1 ≤ j ≤ K for some r < 1
and 0 otherwise. Then γ˜j = rj−1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ K − 1 and γ˜j = frj−1 for K ≤ j ≤ K + L − 1 and 0
otherwise. Also, let jsj+1 ≥ (j − 1)sj for all K + 1 ≤ j ≤ K + L− 1 and (K − 1)sK > KsK+1. Then,
the condition for Theorem 3 is satisfied. Detailed calculations are provided in the Appendix.
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Now having shown that the value of capacity could be positive, we would like to see how much worse it
could be, and a clearer tradeoff between revenue and fitness, if any. The following lemmas formalize some
worst case scenarios. The proofs are moved to the Appendix.
Lemma 5 Let l = 1 and γj’s and si’s satisfy (γ1 − γ2) ≥ (γj − γj+1) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ K and (j − 1)sj ≥
jsj+1 for all j ≥ 2, then there exists no fitness factor f such that the value of capacity is positive.
Lemma 6 Let si’s satisfy (j − 1)sj ≥ jsj+1 for all j ≥ 2, then for any l ≥ 2, the value of capacity is a
decreasing function of f and L.
Recall that the bidders are characterized by their true valuations vi’s and their relevance scores ei’s
and si = eivi. Thus, there is a wide pool of bidders satisfying the conditions in the above lemmas, and
therefore indicating a significant tradeoff between revenue of the auctioneer and the capacity. Intuitively,
the conditions (j−1)sj ≥ jsj+1 in Lemma 6 say that the si’s are well separated, and therefore the payments
that the bidders make at SNE are also well separated. Increasing capacity (via increasing f or L) means
essentially selling a fraction of the clicks at a lower price. When si’s are well separated, the extra revenue
coming from the newly accommodated bidders still fall short of that lost due to lower payments from the
other bidders. Further, the Lemma 6 suggests that there is a phase transition from possibly positive value of
capacity to negative as f increases, and there is a critical f beyond which the auctioneer always loses.
2.3 Efficiency
Now let us look at the change in efficiency due to added capacity as per the model in Section 2.1. First, recall
that the efficiency always increases in the model where the additional capacity is provided by a mediator
(Theorem 1) and in fact the efficiency increases as the fitness of the mediator increases, thus there is no
conflict between the efficiency and the capacity in that model. As we will show in the following, even though
the efficiency might decrease sometimes by adding capacity via the auctioneer controlled model, unlike the
case of revenue of the auctioneer where there is a decrease whenever fitness increases, the efficiency will
always increase when fitness increases. Thus there is a phase transition and a critical fitness beyond which
efficiency is never lost by adding capacity. First, we establish a sufficient condition for the gain in the
efficiency in the following theorem whose simple proof is deferred to the Appendix.
Theorem 7 For a given L, if ∃l ≤ K such that
β > 1−
∑K+L−1
j=K+1 γ˜jsj∑K
j=l γjsj
(6)
where β = min
K≥j≥l
γ˜j
γj
, (7)
then the efficiency improves.
We first provide an example to confirm that the above theorem does not give a vacuous sufficient condi-
tion and the efficiency can indeed improve.
Example 8 Let l = K and geometrically decreasing γj’s as in Example 4 and let si’s satisfy sK+j = αjsK
for some α < 1. Then, the condition for Theorem 7 is satisfied when f >
(
1−αr
1−αLrL
)
. Detailed calculations
are provided in the Appendix.
Now in the following theorem we will show that the efficiency always increases when fitness increases
and there is a phase transition and a critical fitness beyond which efficiency is never lost by adding capacity
via model in Section 2.1. Again, we move the proof to the Appendix.
Theorem 9 The efficiency is an increasing function of fitness f .
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3 Diversification triggered by collusion - vulnerabilty of mechanims
A mediator is a well-known construct in game theory, and is an entity that plays on behalf of some of the
agents who choose to use its services, while the rest of the agents participate in the game directly. In this
section, we initiate a game theoretic study of sponsored search auctions, such as those used by Google and
Yahoo!, involving incentive driven mediators. We refer to such mediators as for-profit mediators, so as to
distinguish them from mediators introduced in prior work[3], who have no monetary incentives, and are
driven by the altruistic goal of implementing certain desired outcomes despite the financial cost incurred.
As we know, the marketplace is mostly about incentives- a game between selfish agents- and it would be
interesting to study mediators which are not altruistic. In particular, we will show that advertisers can
improve their payoffs by using the services of the mediator compared to directly participating in the auction
and mediator can also obtain monetary benefit by managing the advertising burden of its advertisers and in
fact at the same time being compatible with incentive constraints from the advertisers who do not use its
service. The simple intuition behind the above result comes from the observation that since the mediator
has more information about and more control over the bid profile than any individual advertiser, she could
possibly modify their bids, before reporting to the auctioneer (search engine), in a manner to improve their
payoff and could retain a fraction of the improved payoff. However, the above intuition is of course not a
formal game-theoretic argument why the collusion via mediation will work as we do also need to argue that
the other advertisers (the advertisers who do not bid via the mediator) still do not have incentives to change
their bids and slot positions. In the following sub-sections we present a game theoretic analysis for the
sponsored search auctions via mediation and show that the intuition given above is indeed true. We consider
the case where there is only one mediator and the analysis in the other cases essentially remains similar.
3.1 Definitions and Model Setup
• For-profit mediator: A mediator is a reliable entity, which can play on the behalf of agents in a
given game, however it can not enforce the use of its services, and each agent is free to participate
in the game directly. In our study, a for-profit mediator is a mediator who is a selfish agent trying to
maximize a well defined payoff while bidding on the behalf of the advertisers/bidders who choose
to use its services. Throughout the Section 3, we will simply use the word mediator to refer to the
for-profit mediator.
• M -bidders: The advertisers/bidders who bid via the mediator will be called M -bidders. These bid-
ders report their bids to the mediator. As usual, these bidders are selfish agents and they will stick
to using the services of the mediator as long as it provides them a better payoff than what they could
have obtained without using its service. Let us denote the set of M -bidders by M .
• I-bidders: The advertisers who choose not to bid via the mediator will be called I-bidders. These
bidders report their bids to the auctioneer directly. Let us denote the set of I-bidders by I .
• Incentive constraints:
– The bids b1, b2, . . . , bL, bL+1, . . . bK . . . that the bidders report, either to mediator or to the auc-
tioneer, are at the equilibrium of the auction without any mediation under a proper solution
concept. Therefore, in the original game the bidders have no incentives to defect from their
current positions2 . For the Google and Yahoo! like auctions, the solution concept we use is
2It is reasonable to assume this as the auction process has been going for a while now. Further, this requirement can be relaxed
– the mediator first bids on the behalf of the M-bidders to figure out and evolve to an equilibrium before implementing her strategy
to modify their bids.
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Nash equilibria and its refinement symmetric Nash equilibria (SNE). We also consider truthful
mechanisms.
– M -bidders do not want to change the positions they get via directly reporting to the auctioneer
at equilibrium of the auction without any mediation 3. However, they give the mediator the right
to change their bids before reporting to the auctioneer for a potential increase in their payoffs.
• Payoff of the mediator: The mediator’s payoff is defined to be a fixed fraction of the total im-
provement in payoffs from the M -bidders over what they could have obtained without using her
service. Formally, let pi denote the amount bidder i ∈ M pays per-click in the game without me-
diator and p˜i denotes the amount the mediator pays per-click on her behalf. Also let σ(i) be the
slot position assigned to the bidder i, then the payoff of the mediator denoted by UM is defined as
α
∑
i∈M CTRi,σ(i)(pi − p˜i) for a fixed 0 < α < 1. Further, whenever an advertiser i ∈ M gets a
click, an amount equal to (1−α) (pi−p˜i)|M | is given to each one of the M -bidders, and the mediator keeps
an amount equal to α(pi− p˜i) for herself. Therefore, as long as the payoff of the mediator is positive,
no M -bidder will have an incentive to leave the services of the mediator. Moreover, we would like
to mention that for the purpose of incentive analysis, it is enough that the mediator provides a pos-
itive extra amount to the M -bidders whenever she obtains a positive payoff and it does not actually
matter how she allocates it amongst the M -bidders. This is in keeping with the coalitional game with
transferable payoffs[11, 8].
3.2 Designing for-profit mediators
Let us first consider the RBR scheme with GSP currently being used by Google and Yahoo!. The advertisers
are ranked according to ri = eibi where ei is the relevance (quality score) of the bidder i. Let us rename the
advertisers by this ranking i.e. r1 > r2 > · · · > rL > rL+1 > · · · > rK > rK > · · · > rN , therefore the
ith bidders pays ei+1bi+1
ei
= ri+1
ei
per-click under GSP. The solution concept we adopt is Nash equilibrium
and its refinement SNE. Then we shall move to truthful mechanisms.
At Symmetric Nash Equilibrium: Let us first analyze the incentive and revenue properties for the case
where the topL advertisers are the M -bidders i.e. M = {1, 2, . . . , L}. The bids b1, b2, . . . , bL, bL+1, . . . bK . . . bN
are at the SNE of the auction without any mediation, therefore in the original game the bidders have no in-
centives to defect from their current positions. Now the problem is that how should the mediator modify the
bids of M -bidders to improve her payoff while maintaining the incentives constraints from the I-bidders. In
particular, can the mediator modifies the bids of M -bidders so that no I-bidder i has an incentive to change
her bid bi, as well as, the mediator’s payoff is positive4? Let the mediator modify the bids such that r
′
i = r
for i = 1, 2, . . . , l and r′i = ri for i = l + 1, . . . , L, then what r and l should she choose5. The auctioneer
sees the bid profile r ≥ r ≥ · · · ≥ r > rl+1 > · · · > rL > rL+1 > · · · > rK > . . . . Since the original
bid profile was at SNE, no j ≥ L + 1 would like to deviate to any other position s for l ≤ s ≤ K + 1.
Now, only position a j ≥ L+1 can deviate to is the position 1 (she can not do better than this by moving to
2, . . . , l − 1 for she will be paying same price to get less clicks).
3Relaxing this condition gives more freedom to the mediator and she could possibly do even better by changing their positions
as illustrated later in the paper, however advertisers might not like to go down in slot position due to decrease in traffic as well as
branding impression value.
4Note that we are not necessarily looking for the best possible strategy of the mediator so as to maximize her payoff but merely
the strategies which can give her a positive payoff.
5The bids will actually be modified so that r
′
i = r + (L − i)ǫ for an infinitesimally small ǫ > 0. In practice, this ǫ can not be
less than $0.01, however for the purpose of analysis, as in earlier works, we assume that it is a continuous parameter that can be
made infinitesimally small.
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The condition that the I-bidders do not want to move to position 1 is
γjej(vj −
rj+1
ej
) ≥ γ1ej(vj −
r
ej
) ∀j ≥ L+ 1
γj(ejvj − rj+1) ≥ γ1(ejvj − r) ∀j ≥ L+ 1
∴ r ≥ (1−
γj
γ1
)ejvj +
γj
γ1
rj+1 ∀j ≥ L+ 1
Let r∗ = max
j≥L+1
{(1 −
γj
γ1
)ejvj +
γj
γ1
rj+1}
then any selection of r such that r ≥ r∗ and r > rl+1 is fine at SNE and the mediator chooses r = r∗ and
an l such that rl ≥ r > rl+1. Note that such an l ≥ 2 always exists as r ≤ r2 (for the I-bidders did not want
to move to position 1 in the original game at SNE)6,7. The mediator now pays an amount r
ei
per-click on
the behalf of the bidder i ∈ M and therefore the total expected payment per-impression that the mediator
makes on the behalf of M -bidders is (
∑l−1
j=1 γj)r +
∑L
j=l γjrj+1 and the payoff of the mediator is
UM = α
l−1∑
j=1
(rj+1 − r)γj
and each M -bidder gets an expected extra payoff of (1−α) 1
L
∑l−1
j=1(rj+1− r)γj per-impression compared
to what they would get in the auction without mediation. It is clear that this is at the expense of the loss
in the revenue of the auctioneer. Note that in the case when there are only M -bidders and no I-bidders,
the auctioneer gets the minimum price set for all the slots. Now let us illustrate the above analysis by an
example listed in Table 1 wherein the bid profile {ri} is first verified to be at symmetric Nash equlibrium in
Table 2 by recalling that to verify this we need only check the equilibrium condition for one slot up and one
slot down positions (locally envy free property) and finally a suitable r is chosen in Table 3. All the tables
are moved to the appendix.
Now let us consider the case when theM -bidders are not necessarily the top ones but l+1, l+2, . . . , l+L.
The mediator modifies the bids such that r′j = r for j = l + 2, . . . , l + s − 1 for some s ≤ L and r
′
j = rj
otherwise, therefore the auctioneer sees the bid profile r1 > r2 > · · · > rl > rl+1 > r ≥ r · · · ≥ r >
rl+s > · · · > rl+L > rl+L+1 > . . . .
As in the earlier analysis, at SNE, the only condition that need to be checked is that no j ≤ l or
j ≥ l + L + 1 would want to deviate to the (l + 1)th position. Therefore, we must have for j ≤ l and
j ≥ l + L+ 1 ,
γjej(vj −
rj+1
ej
) ≥ γl+1ej(vj −
r
ej
)
γj(ejvj − rj+1) ≥ γl+1(ejvj − r)
∴ r ≥ (1−
γj
γl+1
)ejvj +
γj
γl+1
rj+1.
Let r∗ = max
{j≤l}∪{j≥l+L+1}
{(1 −
γj
γl+1
)ejvj +
γj
γl+1
rj+1}
then clearly r∗ ≤ rl+2 and choosing any r ≥ r∗ and an s such that rl+s−1 ≥ r > rl+s is fine at SNE.
However, in this case or in the case whenM -bidders are the top ones, such a r to improve their payoffs might
not always exist as can been seen by considering the example mentioned above when M = {2, 3, 4, 5}.
However, mediator could possibly improve even in these cases, if the M -bidders do not mind moving up in
positions, as she does not neccesarily have to satisfy the incentive constraints from higher position I-bidders
to not change their current positions.
6Of course, the mediator will not be able to choose such a r and l all at once and will rather evolve to it by trying suitable rl’s.
7Sometimes for example when l = 2 in the above, the mediator could possibly do even better by modifying bids as r1 > r2 >
r ≥ r ≥ · · · ≥ r > rl+1 > · · · > rL > rL+1 > · · · > rK > . . . and so on.
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Similar analysis holds when there are different groups of M -bidders such that all advertisers in a group
bid via the same mediator whereas different groups may have different mediators associated with them. In
fact, in this case the maximization will be over smaller sets and the mediators could possibly do even better.
A possibility not analyzed above is that whether the mediator can do better by moving the positions of
the advertisers either individually or sliding them all together. Consider the example given earlier and let
mediator slide every M -bidder one slot down by modifying the bid profile so that r′i = 12 for all M-bidders
as shown in the Table 4. It can be verified as before that it is still at SNE and in fact in this case mediator’s
payment on behalf of M -bidders is much lesser compared to the earlier case. This suggests that indeed the
mediator could do better by moving slot positions. However, advertisers might not like to change positions,
at least not to the lower slots due to associated branding impression values coming from higher slots and
even though their payoff might increase by allowing so, they might not like to lose in terms of traffic which
decreases by going down.
At non-Symmetric Nash Equilibrium: If the bid profile is at non-symmetric Nash equilibrium an
analysis similar to the case of SNE can be adopted. For example, when M = {1, 2, . . . , L} the mediator
modifies the bids as r′i = r for i = 2, . . . , l and r
′
i = ri for i = 1, l+1, . . . , L and the condition on r now is
r ≥ max
j≥L+1
{(1−
γj
γ2
)ejvj +
γj
γ2
rj+1}.
Truthful mechanisms: Truthful mechanisms are considered to be very desirable from the advertisers’
perspective since truth-telling is a dominant strategy for every one and the advertises do not need to be
sophisticated to play the auction game. However, as we argue below it is more vulnerable to for-profit me-
diation and even the mediators need not be sophisticated in this case, unlike the ones discussed earlier in
the paper. In regard to position auctions, Aggarwal et al.[2] presented a truthful mechanism called laddered
auction, which is compatible with a given weighted ranking function such as RBR, and is the unique truthful
auction given this ranking function. Now, if the mediator modifies the bids of the M -bidders in a manner so
that their slot positions (i.e. ranks) do not change, the I-bidders still report truthfully as its a dominant strat-
egy. The mediator could choose such a minimum possible bid profile to get the best improvement in payoffs
and in particular modifying every M -bidder’s bid to a value only infinitesimally more than just enough to
retain the position of the least ranked M -bidder suffices.
Note that in above construction of for-profit mediators, we were not necessarily looking for the best
possible strategy of the mediator so as to maximize her payoff but merely the strategies which could give
her a positive payoff and the M -bidders were the ones assigned to the concecutive slots. More sophisticated
mediators, such as where M -bidders need not be concecutive, should also be investigated. In general, if the
mediator is sophisticated enough to exploit her best possible strategy, how does the modified bid profile look
at equilibrium? We leave these directions open for future studies.
Collusion-proof mechanisms: Having given some constructions of for-profit mediators, it is natural
to ask whether there exist mechanisms which are impervious to collusion via for-profit mediation and if
they do how do they effect the revenue of the auctioneer i.e. can we design collusion-resistant mechanisms
with good revenue guarantee? The answer is in negative and the results of Golderbeg and Hartline[8] can
be adapted to the case of sponsored search auctions to show that only mechanisms which are imprevious
to collusion are posted-price i.e. that post a “take it or leave it” price for each advertiser, and the revenue
guarentee from such mechanism could indeed be very bad in the worst case. However, using consensus-
estimate technique of [7], the authors in [8] design randomized collusion-resistant mechanisms if one asks
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incentive constraints to be maintained only with high-probability. Nevertheless, as these results are mostly
asymptotic in nature, they do not seem applicable to the case of sponsored search auctions, due to the
smaller number of slots. Thus the auctioneer can not do very much via mechanism design to avoid for-profit
mediation and the mediators are likely to prevail.
4 Concluding remarks
In the present work, we investigated market forces that would lead to the emergence of new classes of
players in the sponsored search market. We reported a 3-fold diversification, in the terms of the emergence
of new market mechanisms, the emergence of new for-profit agents, and the participation of a wider pool
of bidders/advertisers, triggered by two inherent features of the sponsored search market, namely, capacity
constraints and collusion-vulnerability of current mechanisms.
In the first scenario, we present a comparative study of two models motivated by capacity constraints
- one where the additional capacity is provided by for-profit agents (or, mediators), who compete for slots
in the original auction, draw traffic, and run their own sub-auctions, and the other, where the additional
capacity is provided by the auctioneer herself, by essentially acting as a mediator and running a single
combined auction. This study was initiated by us in [12], where the mediator-based model was studied. In
the present work, we study the auctioneer-based model and show that this single combined-auction model
seems inferior to the mediator-based model in terms of revenue or efficiency guarantee due to added capacity.
In the second scenario, we initiate a game theoretic study of current sponsored search auctions, involving
incentive driven mediators who exploit the fact that these mechanisms are not collusion-resistant. In par-
ticular, we show that advertisers can improve their payoffs by using the services of the mediator compared
to directly participating in the auction, and that the mediator can also obtain monetary benefit by managing
the advertising burden of its advertisers, without violating incentive constraints from the advertisers who do
not use its services. We also point out that the auctioneer can not do very much via mechanism design to
avoid such for-profit mediation without losing badly in terms of revenue, and therefore, the mediators are
likely to prevail. Another implication of our results applies to the traditional media. Publishers of traditional
media, such as newspapers and network TV and radio, have seen significant declines in their audience mar-
ket shares, as more people have shifted to the Web as the source for information and entertainment. Their
advertising revenues have decreased significantly as well. Our results show that one way these traditional
media players can retain the loyalty of their advertisers is to manage their online auctions! By mediating
their auctions, they can provide better payoffs to their clients, and thus prevent them from switching alle-
giance to the online giants, such as Google and Yahoo! Other than creating a new revenue source for the
traditional media businesses, it would allow them to retain their own networks and give them precious time
to reposition themselves and figure out the best possible ways to take their content online, and compete
effectively in a new market space.
In conclusion, our analysis indicates that there are significant opportunities for diversification in the
internet economy and we should expect it to continue to develop richer structure, with room for different
types of agents and mechanisms to coexist.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3: Let η = minl≤j≤K γ˜j−γ˜j+1γj−γj+1 then we have γ˜j− γ˜j+1 ≥ η(γj−γj+1) for l ≤ j ≤ K.
At their corresponding minimum SNE [5, 13], the original revenue of the auctioneer without added capacity
and the new revenue of the auctioneer after adding capacity are R0 =
∑K
j=1(γj − γj+1)jsj+1 and R =∑K˜
j=1(γ˜j − γ˜j+1)jsj+1 respectively.
∴ R−R0 =∑K
j=1 [(γ˜j − γ˜j+1)− (γj − γj+1)] jsj+1+
∑K˜
j=K+1(γ˜j − γ˜j+1)jsj+1
=
∑K
j=l−1 [(γ˜j − γ˜j+1)− (γj − γj+1)] jsj+1+
∑K˜
j=K+1(γ˜j −
˜γj+1))jsj+1
≥ (γl − γ˜l)(l − 1)sl +
∑K
j=l(η − 1)(γj − γj+1)jsj+1
+
∑K˜
j=K+1(γ˜j − γ˜j+1)jsj+1
= (γl − γ˜l)(l − 1)sl
+
∑K˜
j=K+1(γ˜j − γ˜j+1)jsj+1
−(1− η)
∑K
j=l(γj − γj+1)jsj+1
and hence follows the theorem.
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Missing calculations for Example 4:
We have η = minK≥j≥l
γ˜j−γ˜j+1
γj−γj+1
= fr
K−1(1−r)
rK−1
= f(1− r).
Now, (γl − γ˜l)(l − 1)sl
+
∑K+L−1
j=K+1 (γ˜j − γ˜j+1)jsj+1
≥ (γK − γ˜K)(K − 1)sK
+KsK+1(γ˜K+1 − γ˜K+L)
= rK−1(1− f)(K − 1)sK + fr
KKsK+1.
Also
∑K
j=l(γj − γj+1)jsj+1 = r
K−1KsK+1,
∴ 1−
(
(γl−γ˜l)(l−1)sl+
PK+L−1
j=K+1
(γ˜j−γ˜j+1)jsj+1PK
j=l(γj−γj+1)jsj+1
)
≤ 1−
rK−1(1−f)(K−1)sK+fr
KKsK+1
rK−1KsK+1
= 1−
(
(K−1)sK
KsK+1
(1− f) + fr
)
= f − fr + (1− f)− (K−1)sK
KsK+1
(1− f)
= f(1− r) + (1− f)
(
1− (K−1)sK
KsK+1
)
< f(1− r) = η.
Proof of Lemma 5: Let us define
i0 = max
1≤i≤K
{i : γ1fγ1 < γi}
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then γ˜j = γj+1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ i0 − 1, γ˜i0 = γ1fγ1, and γ˜j ≥ γj for all j ≥ i0 + 1. Clearly, i0 ≥ 1. Now,
R0 =
∑K
j=1(γj − γj+1)jsj+1
= γ1s2 −
∑K
j=2 γj [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
R = γ˜1s2 −
∑K+L−1
j=2 γ˜j [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
∴ R−R0 =
(γ˜1 − γ1)s2 −
∑K
j=2(γ˜j − γj) [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
−
∑K+L−1
j=K+1 γ˜j [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
∴ when i0 ≥ 2 we have
R−R0 = −(γ1 − γ2)s2
+
∑i0−1
j=2 (γj − γj+1) [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
+(γi0 − γ1fγ1) [(i0 − 1)si0 − i0si0+1]
−
∑K
j=i0+1
(γ˜j − γj) [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
−
∑K+L−1
j=K+1 γ˜j [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
≤ −(γ1 − γ2)s2 + (γ1 − γ2) [s2 − i0si0+1]
(recall that (γ1 − γ2) ≥ (γj − γj+1)
and (j − 1)sj − jsj+1 ≥ 0 for all j ≥ 2 )
= −(γ1 − γ2)i0si0+1
< 0.
when i0 = 1 we have
R−R0 = −(γ1 − γ1fγ1)s2
−
∑K
j=2(γ˜j − γj) [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
−
∑K+L−1
j=K+1 γ˜j [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 6: Let
i0 = max
1≤i≤K
{i : γlfγ1 < γi}
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then γ˜j = γj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 , γ˜j = γj+1 for all l ≤ j ≤ i0 − 1, γ˜i0 = γlfγ1, and γ˜j ≥ γj for all
j ≥ i0 + 1. Clearly, i0 ≥ l ≥ 2.
∴ R = γ˜1s2 −
∑K+L−1
j=2 γ˜j [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
= γ1s2 −
∑l−1
j=2 γj [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
−
∑i0−1
j=l γj+1 [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
−γlfγ1 [(i0 − 1)si0 − i0si0+1]
−
∑K+L−1
j=i0+1
γ˜j [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
Now let us increase f to f ′ and denote the new position based CTRs as γ˜j
′
’s and the new revenue of the
auctioneer as R′ then two cases arise - one where i0 does not change and other where it changes to i0 − 1.
Case 1: when i0 does not change by increasing f to f
′
. Clearly, γ˜j
′
≥ γ˜j for all j ≥ i0 + 1 as we will
be choosing elements from a set with larger values. Also recall that si’s satisfy (j − 1)sj − jsj+1 ≥ 0 for
all j ≥ 2. Therefore, the second last term in the expression of R strictly decrease and the last term also
decreases and we get R′ < R.
Case 2: When i0 changes to i0 − 1 by increasing f to f
′
. In this case, γ˜′j = γj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 ,
γ˜
′
j = γj+1 for all l ≤ j ≤ i0 − 2, γ˜
′
i0−1
= γlf
′
γ1, and γ˜
′
j ≥ γ˜j for all j ≥ i0. Therefore,
R
′
−R = γi0 [(i0 − 2)si0−1 − (i0 − 1)si0 ]
−γlf
′
γ1 [(i0 − 2)si0−1 − (i0 − 1)si0 ]
−
∑K+L−1
j=i0
(γ˜
′
j − γ˜j) [(j − 1)sj − jsj+1]
≤ (γi0 − γlf
′
γ1) [(i0 − 2)si0−1 − (i0 − 1)si0 ]
< 0.
Proof of Theorem 7: We have
E0 =
∑K
j=1 γjsj
E =
∑K+L−1
j=1 γ˜jsj
=
∑l−1
j=1 γjsj +
∑K+L−1
j=l γ˜jsj.
∴ E − E0 =
∑K
j=l(γ˜j − γj)sj +
∑K+L−1
j=K+1 γ˜jsj.
Let
β = min
K≥j≥l
γ˜j
γj
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then
E − E0 ≥
K+L−1∑
j=K+1
γ˜jsj − (1− β)
K∑
j=l
γjsj.
and hence follows the theorem.
Missing calculations for Example 8:
β = γ˜K
γK
= fr
K−1
rK−1
= f.
Also,
∑K+L−1
j=K+1 γ˜jsj
=
∑K+L−1
j=K+1 fr
j−1sj
= frKsK
∑L−1
j=1 r
j−1αj
= αfrKsK
(
1−rL−1αL−1
1−rα
)
∴ 1−
PK+L−1
j=K+1
γ˜jsjPK
j=l γjsj
= 1−
αfrKsK
“
1−rL−1αL−1
1−rα
”
rK−1sK
= 1− αfr
(
1−rL−1αL−1
1−rα
)
= 1−rα−αrf+fr
LαL
1−rα
= f(1−rα)+1−f−αr+fr
LαL
1−rα
= f +
(
1− f 1−r
LαL
1−αr
)
< f if f > 1−αr
1−rLαL
.
Proof of Theorem 9: Let
i0 = max
1≤i≤K
{i : γlfγ1 < γi}
then γ˜j = γj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 , γ˜j = γj+1 for all l ≤ j ≤ i0 − 1, γ˜i0 = γlfγ1, and γ˜j ≥ γj for all
j ≥ i0 + 1. Clearly, i0 ≥ l.
E =
∑K+L−1
j=1 γ˜jsj
=
∑l−1
j=1 γjsj +
∑i0−1
j=l γj+1sj
+γlfγ1si0 +
∑K+L−1
j=i0+1
γ˜jsj.
Now let us increase f to f ′ and denote the new position based CTRs as γ˜j
′
’s and the new efficiency as E′
then two cases arise - one where i0 does not change and other where it changes to i0 − 1.
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Case 1: when i0 does not change by increasing f to f
′
. Clearly, γ˜j
′
≥ γ˜j for all j ≥ i0 + 1 as we will
be choosing elements from a set with larger values. Therefore, the second last term in the expression of E
strictly increase and the last term also increases and we get E′ > E.
Case 2: When i0 changes to i0 − 1 by increasing f to f
′
. In this case, γ˜′j = γj for all 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 ,
γ˜
′
j = γj+1 for all l ≤ j ≤ i0 − 2, γ˜
′
i0−1
= γlf
′
γ1, and γ˜
′
j ≥ γ˜j for all j ≥ i0. Therefore,
E
′
=
∑l−1
j=1 γjsj +
∑i0−2
j=l γj+1sj
+γlf
′
γ1si0−1 +
∑K+L−1
j=i0
γ˜jsj.
≥ E + (γlf
′
γ1 − γi0)si0−1
> E
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i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
γi 1 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.15 0.10 0
eivi 26 22 20 18 17 15 12 12 9
ri = eibi 25 20 16 15 14 13 11 10 9
eipi 20 16 15 14 13 11 10 9 0
r
′
i = eib
′
i 14.2 14.2 14.2 14.2 14
eip˜i 14.2 14.2 14.2 14 13
Table 1: Position based CTRs, true valuations, bid profile, and modified bid profile when M = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
(recall that pi denotes the amount bidder i pays per-click in the game without mediator and p˜i denotes the
amount the mediator pays per-click on her behalf).
position j payoff: payoff by defecting to j − 1: payoff by defecting to j + 1: SNE condition
satisfied
uj = γj(ejvj − rj+1) u
j−1
j = γj−1(ejvj − rj) u
j+1
j = γj+1(ejvj − rj+2) (YES/NO)
1 1 (26 -20)= 0.6 (26-16) =
6 6 YES
2 0.6 (22 -16)= 1(22-20)= 0.5 (22-15) =
3.6 2 3.5 YES
3 0.5 (20 -15)= 0.6 (20-16)= 0.4 (20-14) =
2.5 2.4 2.4 YES
4 0.4 (18 -14)= 0.5 (18 -15)= 0.3 (18-13)=
1.6 1.5 1.5 YES
5 0.3 (17-13)= 0.4 (17-14) = 0.2(17-11)=
1.2 1.2 1.2 YES
6 0.2 (15-11)= 0.3 (15-13)= 0.15(15-10)=
0.8 0.6 0.75 YES
7 0.15 (12-10)= 0.2 (12-11)= 0.10 (12-9)=
0.3 0.2 0.3 YES
8 0.10 (12-9)= 0.15 (12-10)= 0 (12-0) =
0.3 0.3 0 YES
9 0 0.10 (9-9)= 0 0 YES
Table 2: Verifying the SNE conditions
j xj r
∗ r l mediator’s payoff UM :
= ejvj − uj α
∑l−1
j=1(rj+1 − r)γj
6 15-0.8 =
14.2
7 12-0.3= 14.2 14.2 4 7.28 α
11.7
8 12-0.3 =
11.7
9 9-0 =
9
Table 3: Computing r and l: xj := (1 − γjγ1 )ejvj +
γj
γ1
rj+1 = ejvj − γj(ejvj − rj+1) = ejvj − uj (as
γ1 = 1)
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position j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
bidder i assinged to j 6 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
eivi 15 26 22 20 18 17 12 12 9
ri = eibi 13 25 20 16 15 14 11 10 9
eipi 11 20 16 15 14 13 10 9 0
r
′
i = eib
′
i 12 12 12 12 12
eip˜i 12 12 12 12 11
mediator’s payoff UM : 22.8 α
Table 4: Sliding positions could improve mediator’s payoff
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